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Before about 1660 when the modern Pascalian concept of probability emerged we 
had no formal methods for making predictions from incomplete or unreliable 
information (Hacking 1975). Since then many rival interpretations of 
probability have appeared and some have disappeared. Philosophical issues 
about the true meaning of probability remain (eg whether probability is a 
subjective or objective concept) but, nevertheless, a formidable range of 
practical numerical methods has been established for making predictions under 
uncertainty. 
The appearance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and expert systems are 
stimulating a new debate. AI systems of all kinds need to make decisions, often 
under uncertainty. Statistical decision theory has the concept of mathematical 
probability to represent uncertainty but AI emphasises "heuristics". Does AI 
imply new views of uncertainty, or only the adaptation of standard methods? 
Practical developments suggest the latter. So far expert system designers have 
only modified deterministic knowledge representations like semantic nets and 
production rules with numerical belief coefficients (Fox, 1985). Although the 
techniques may be formally criticised (Spiegelhalter, 1985) fuzzy logic, 
Bayesian methods and the Shafer-Dempster theory of belief functions have all 
been used with some success. 
A more radical view is that AI's goals require a reorientation of ideas about 
probability. Classical statistics deliberately seeks models which are 
abstractions (simplifications) of the world, but models are only valid if 
features of the problem do not violate their assumptions. Intelligent problem 
solvers (eg autonomous robots, learning programs, and statisticians) encounter 
situations which are ill-defined; the validity of the assumptions is dubious or 
unknown. Under these circumstances we should either adapt a method to the 
idiosyncrasies of the situation or adopt methods for dealing with uncertainty 
which make weaker assumptions. 
AI has always been especially concerned with ill-defined problems. It 
advocates "weak methods" for problem solving which embody only weak 
assumptions. To illustrate, the knowledge that "claiming a breakthrough in 
cancer is unwise" influences my organisation' s public relations policy. This 
heuristic is hard to formalise (what is a breakthrough?) but not vacuous. In 
the present state of the art, formalisation would introduce unrealistic 
restrictions on its possible meanings. 
Decision making under uncertainty is often an ill-defined problem. When new 
problems are encountered (eg by a doctor), or invented (eg by a scientist) 
little may be known about their structure. To date expert systems have mostly 
been used for routine decisions where the structure is relatively well known. 
For the future we need weak, knowledge based methods for situations where the 
assumptions of strong, formal methods are too fierce. 
Non-numerical methods as weak methods 
One place where restrictive assumptions creep in is in the model of 
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quantitative and distributional features of the application domain (eg 
conditional independence assumptions). Paul Cohen has explored non-numerical 
methods for coping with uncertainty in his Theory of Endorsements. He 
recommends evaluation of hypotheses through the reasons (endorsements) for 
believing or disbelieving them. 
There are many insights in Cohen's work but I am not sure that it satisfies the 
need for weak methods. We noted two strategies for dealing with idiosyncratic 
problems. (1) Elaborate the model so it takes explicit account of the details 
or (2) use a method less sensitive to the details. Cohen's approach seems to 
be of the first kind. The ability to deal with reasons for beliefs may be 
useful but it entails risks that the method may "be too cumbersome to be 
useful" and may "make unrealistic assumptions about the accuracy or 
availability of the evidence it requires" (Cohen, p 186). 
An alternative is to relax quantitative assumptions by substituting a 
qualitative (logical) vocabulary for talking about different kinds of 
uncertainty. I consider three types here; possibility, probability and 
plausibility, after the next section which places them in a general context. 
Uncertainty as a type of knowledge 
Although knowledge is a general concept most expert systems treat it narrowly, 
dealing only with the facts, rules etc of a domain. A wider view is that the 
domain is only one source of knowledge. Some knowledge is general (eg about the 
behaviour of physical objects), some more limited (eg knowledge aqout the 
current problem). Uncertainty knowledge is panoramic; it is a specialised form 
of knowledge, yet it straddles all other types of general, domain and problem 
specific knowledge bases (Fox, 1975). This figure illustrates the relationship. 
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE WORLD __... 
General facts, rules, definitions etc .__ 
t i 
PROBLEM KNOWLEDGE 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT UNCERTAINTY AND BELIEF ---
Possibility, plausibility, probability � 
� i Data and inferences 
DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE 
Specialised facts and rules of 4i-
evidence and argument .--. 
Possibility, probability and plausibility 
POSSIBILITY. Consider some proposition P, which may be any fragment of 
knowledge - a general rule, a domain fact or an item of data. P is said to be 
possible if no conditions that are necessary for P are violated. P may have no 
necessary conditions, or we may be ignorant of the state of these conditions; 
these circumstances do not affect a statement of possibility. We may also have 
254 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
evidence for or against P without affecting possibility. Possibilistic methods 
can introduce propositions into problem knowledge without commitment to a 
degree of belief. This is a fragment of possibility knowledge expressed as a 
logic program: 
Pis possible if not ( Pis not possible ). 
P is not possible if P is exclusive of Q 
and Q is certain. 
P is not possible if P is impossible. 
P is impossible if C is a necessary condition for P 
and C is not possible. 
Pis not impossible if not( Pis impossible ). 
'Necessary conditions' are domain knowledge, or derived by applying general 
knowledge to domain knowledge. 
PLAUSIBILITY. P is plausible if P is possible, and there is an argument in 
support of P or the arguments for P are stronger than those against (however we 
define 'stronger'). I n  "it is plausible that there are sub-atomic particles 
yet to be discovered" the plausibility argument might be a mathematical one 
from certain physical assumptions. 
Where arguments exist for and against P (eg from different axioms) then we may 
use various strategies to decide plausibility. These include preferring 
arguments from general principles rather than special cases, or short arguments 
rather than long ones. P may be plausible whether or not there is evidence to 
support P, and even if there is evidence against. This is an illustrative 
logic program for plausibility: 
P is plausible if A is argument for P and 
not ( P is exclusive of Q and 
Q is more plausible than P ). 
P is not plausible if not ( P is plausible ) 
P is not plausible if P is implausible. 
P is implausible if P is exclusive of Q and 
Q is more plausible than P. 
Pis not implausible if not ( Pis implausible) .  
Arguments include special case (P is a special case of P'), analogy (Pis an 
analogy of P'), and model based arguments (P follows from some causal model M) . 
Strategies of argument are domain independent, but particular special-general 
relationships, analogies, models etc may be domain specific. The relationship 
'is more plausible than' requires a function to order its arguments which may 
or may not be numerical. 
PROBABILITY. P is probable if P is possible and there is at least one item of 
evidence in favour of P. When evidence goes both ways we may again choose 
non-numerical strategies for resolving the conflict, eg to prefer direct 
evidence over indirect. This a logic program fo� probability: 
P is probable if E is evidence for P and 
not ( P is exclusive of Q and 
Q is more probable than P ) . 
Pis not probable if not (Pis probable). 
P is not probable if P is improbable. 
P is improbable if P is exclusive of Q 
and Q is more probable than P. 
Pis not improbable if not (Pis improbable). 
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Evidence for P may be observations of P, reports of P, or signs associated with 
P (eg frequentistically). The relationship 'is more probable than' requires a 
function to order its arguments. This need not be numerical (eg show one set of 
evidence to be an experimental artifact) but numerical functions are best 
known, eg those which compute likelihood ratios. 
Revision of belief 
As knowledge about a problem is obtained we may have to revise beliefs in 
hypotheses. This classical problem must be addressed by weak methods as well 
as strong ones. The problem of combining information is dealt with by case 
rules. Domain independent rules are preferred, but domain specific revision 
rules cannot be ignored. 
CASE 1: INDEPENDENCE. Many states of the world are independent of each other. 
Consequently the truth, falsity or certainty of some statements about the world 
are independent of the truth, falsity or uncertainty of others. This is 
trivially true when the states are unrelated to each other, but also if one 
believes that (P is possible) then assertions that (E is evidence against P) or 
(E is evidence for P) have no logical consequences for continuing to believe P 
is possible. 
CASE 2: INCONSISTENCY. If it is asserted that (A is a conclusive argument for 
P) but also that (E is compelling evidence against P) then a rule of 
combination is inappropriate. The system should report the inconsistency 
(making no conclusions from its components), or assess the sources · of the 
. conflict before taking any action (essentially Cohen's approach, op cit). 
CASE 3: PRECEDENCE. Suppose there is evidence or argument in favour of P, but 
nothing conclusive. For example there is evidence in favour of a diagnosis of 
peptic ulcer and against gastric cancer. Now suppose a new piece of knowledge 
becomes available to the effect that endoscopic investigation has revealed a 
clear ulcer. A conclusive state takes precedence over a probable one. 
Similarly a probable state takes precedence over one that is merely assumed in 
the absence of any information (more detail in Fox, 1985). 
CASE 4: AGGREGATION. The final case is the familiar one of aggregation, where 
belief is a summary of evidence and argument. There is only space for one 
example here, so a domain specific one is taken. For example take the domain 
rule: 
if imminent invasion of SomeCountry is ambiguous 
then surveillance of SomeCountry is recommended 
A proposition like 'imminent invasion of Monrovia' might be treated as 
ambiguous, however much evidence against it has been accrued, if the 
alternative is plausible. Domain knowledge might show that invasion is 
ambiguous because it is in the interests of some other country to invade, 
however much evidence there is that the country is friendly. The traditional 
domain independent rule that some threshold of posterior probability is 
exceeded is only one of a number of techniques. 
The problem of formalisation 
AI methods are often informal by comparison with traditional techniques. 
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Sometimes the flexibility of informal knowledge may be worth the lack of 
formalisation. Wherever possible however we should consider the validity and 
limits of a method. Three criteria are considered here; completeness, 
consistency and correctness. 
Like knowledge itself this scheme is not complete - perhaps for the same 
reasons that knowledge can never be complete. This paper presents three types 
of uncertainty, the current implementation has about a dozen which people have 
found to be sufficiently general that they have entered the English language 
(Fox, 1985). In time more may be disovered. 
A formal scheme should not be inconsistent. It should not be possible to 
generate a contradiction from the axioms. Since the scheme is not exhaustive 
(complete) over some set of uncertainty axioms we cannot be sure that it will 
not, given some further extension, generate an inconsistency, though I have 
found none yet. Heuristics carry no guarantees. 
In what sense could these distinctions between possibility, probability and 
plausibility be 'correct'? I do not know whether their correctness is formally 
decidable. However (1) the distinctions seem obvious; (2) ideas of possibility 
and plausibility have recurred in the history of probabilistic thinking, and 
never been entirely thrown over (Hacking, 1975); (3) they are routinely used in 
science and technology and similar "unknown country". 
To conclude 
"I am inviting the reader to imagine ... that there is a space of 
possible theories about probability that has been rather constant 
from 1660 to the present . . . perhaps an understanding of our 
space and its preconditions can liberate us from the cycle of 
probability theories that has trapped us for so long" Hacking, 
1975, p 16. 
Note Hacking's use of the word "possible". 
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